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THE TARGETING OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS IN CHILE:
A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
Carine Clert and Quentin Wodon93
Introduction
The government of Chile has been using for many years a system for the targeting of many of its
income transfers and other social programs. The system is based on the ficha CAS, a two page
form that households must fill if they wish to apply for benefits. Each household is attributed a
score on the basis of the ficha CAS, and this score is used to determine eligibility not only for
income transfers (e.g., pension assistance and family allowances), but also for water subsidies,
access to social housing, and childcare centers. At the local level, municipalities also use the
form for the targeting of their own programs and safety nets. Almost a third of all Chilean
households have been filling the form. Taken as whole, the programs which are targeted using
theficha CAS play a major role not only in the alleviation of poverty, but also in its prevention by
enabling vulnerable households to receive or not state and municipal support.
This papers provides an assessment of the ficha CAS system using both quantitative and
qualitative methods of investigation. After describing theficha CAS system and the main income
transfers and other programs which are targeted using the system, the paper uses data from the
nationally representative 1998 CASEN survey to provide quantitative measures of performance
for each program. Following Wodon and Yitzhaki (2000), the quantitative performance measures
are based on a decomposition of the Gini income elasticity of the various programs into a
targeting component which is based on who benefits from the programs and who does not, and an
allocation component which captures the impact of the variability in program benefits among
participants. Overall, the programs appear to be well targeted.
The good quantitative performance of the program does not mean that the ficha CAS is without
any limitations. In order to look in some detail at these limitations, the paper relies on a study of
the experience, perceptions and recommendations of poor citizens on the one hand and
practitioners using the ficha CAS at the local level on the other hand (Clert, 2000a, 2000b).
Evidence derives from a stratified survey of 88 randomly sampled households in the municipality
of Huechuraba, a comparatively poor area in the Greater Santiago area and from qualitative
interviews with a sub-sample of households. Evidence also derives from focus-group discussions
and semi-structured interviews with professionals located in that municipality and from
interviews with central government officials. The fieldwork was carried out between December
1997 and June 1998. The triangulation of household-level interviews and focus group discussions
with municipal staff in Huechuraba revealed that poor households often lack infor-mation about
the government programns and how to apply for their benefits. The qualitative work also revealed
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potential deficiencies and biases in the eligibility criteria and associated targeting methods based
on theficha CAS. While the targeting system as a whole is sound, recommendations can be made
for improving its effectiveness and its fairness.
The paper is divided in four sections. Section One introduces the paper by presenting some
background information on theficha CAS and the targeted safety nets and other social programs
reviewed in this paper. Section Two provides evidence for a quantitative assessment of the
targeting of some of these social entitlements using the CASEN household survey data while
Sections Three sheds light on the a more qualitative assessment of targeting methods, based on
the experience and views of the poor themselves and of social practitioners. Conclusions and
policy implications are provided in the last section.
Background
This section first sheds light on the official means-testing instrument used by the Chilean
government, the ficha CAS or CAS form. It then puts the forthcoming findings of the paper in
context by presenting the key safety nets and programs reviewed in this paper and their
importance in the social protection of the poor.
The Ficha CAS
Introduced during the military regime (1973-1989) and modified by the post-1990 democratic
governments, theficha CAS94 is a two page form which is used for determining the eligibility of
households to a number of Government programs including not only monetary transfers
(Subsidios Monetarios), but also access to low income housing and childcare centres.9 5 A
reproduction of the form is provided in Appendix Two. The form provides detailed information
on housing conditions of the dwelling unit (e.g., material used for the construction of the housing
unit, number and type of rooms, access to water, latrine and sanitary services, access to
electricity, etc.); on members of the dwelling unit (their occupation, educational level, date of
birth, and income. Additional information is provided on material assets held by the household
(housing status, television, heating equipment, and refrigerator). Points are allocated to
households on the basis of the information provided, with the number of points fluctuating
between 380 and 770 points. Households with a total of inferior to 500 points are considered as
extremely poor and those with a total number of between 500 and 540 points are considered as
poor. The Ministry of Planning MIDEPLAN is responsible for the design of theficha CAS. The
recruitment of the employees administrating the form is done at the discretion of the municipality,
but training must be provided by the Ministry. Municipalities usually separate the activities of
data collection and data entry from those of needs assessment. Data collection and entry tend to
be done by a departnent of social information within the municipality, while the control of the
needs assessment is usually done by social workers and tecnico-sociales (welfare assistants).
The national income transfer programs which are targeted using the CAS scoring system apply
the formula in a strict manner in order for determining eligibility. The score obtained by a
household automatically and exclusively prevails, so that eligibility depends only on the number
of points obtained. The ficha is also used for targeting locally financed safety nets, but in this
94 Ficha de Estratificaci6n Social.
9 At present the official name of the form is theficha CAS-II.
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case social workers and other professionals can often give some weight to other eligibility criteria
such as the presence of a chronic illness, the civil status of household members, and their actual
finiancial resources at the time of request (the ficha is completed every three years, and there may
bo differences between the status of households when they apply for benefits, as compared to
their status when they filled the form). For housing programs as well, differences can be
observed in the use of the ficha at various levels of government. Professionals dealing with
central government programs (viviendas bdsicas and vivienda progresiva) must follow the
method of calculation defmed by the Ministry of Housing (SERVIU), while professionals
irvolved in municipal initiatives have some discretionary power.
One of the advantages of using the ficha for many different programs is that this reduces the cost
of means-testing. The cost of a CAS interview is about US$8.65 per household. The Ministry of
P anning estimates that 30 percent of Chilean households undergo interviews, which seems
reasonable given that the target group for the subsidy programs is the poorest 20 percent. The
CAS system is used as a targeting instrument for utility subsidies, income transfers, social
housing subsidy, and pension subsidies among other programs. Because the fixed administrative
costs of targeting are spread across several programs, the CAS is very cost-effective. In 1996,
administrative costs represented a mere 1.2 percent of the benefits distributed using the CAS
system. If the administrative costs of the CAS system were to be borne by the water subsidies
a]one, for example, they would represent 17.8 percent of the value of the subsidies.
The Targeted Programs: Their Role in Fostering Security and Alleviating Poverty
lM[any national and local Government programs rely on the CAS system for their targeting.
Locally, Comunas generate from their own budgets other safety net programs which vary in their
amnount and eligibility criteria, but these cannot be evaluated with the CASEN. The national
p -ograms implemented with the ficha CAS and reviewed in this paper include means-tested
pr nsions, family allowances, water subsidies, social housing, and child care. As developed
b, low, most of these social entitlements play a major potential role in decreasing vulnerability
ajid alleviating poverty, which makes the issue of targeting a crucial one. Full descriptions of the
programs is provided in Appendix One.
o Pensions PASIS (Pensi6n de Asistencia): Means-tested state pensions are provided to elderly
and/or disabled individuals through PASIS. To be eligible, an elderly individual needed to
have a total income below half of the minimum pension allowance, which was CP$ 23,415
per month in 1998.96 The eligibility threshold for the disabled is the amount of the minimum
pension allowance. While the income transfers provided through PASIS are low in
comparison with the minimum wage, household interviews in the Comuna of Huechuraba
suggest that the transfers can be significant in the eyes of those who do not have any Qther
source of income or family support to rely upon. In addition, those who receive PASIS
pensions are automatically eligible for free access to public health services through the health
gratuity card. By securing an entitlement to health, PASIS thus provides low income elderly
and invalid or disabled people with a key mechanism of long term social protection.
* Family allowances SUF (Subsidio Unico Familiar): Family allowances are important because
they help in coping with the extra expenses due to the birth of children, as well as with the
possibility of a reduction in earnings due to the fact that pregnant women and women who
9' In 2001, the PASIS is now worth 35104 Chilean pesos.
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have delivered may have to stop working for a while. The loss in earnings is particularly
likely for women involved in precarious jobs which do not provide them with maternal and
other family benefits. The amount per child above three years of age was CP$2,500 per
month in 1998, at the time the CASEN was implemented. The amount per child below three
years of age was CP$2,800. Maternal benefits were also $2,800 per month for a period of ten
months, with eligibility as of the fifth month of pregnancy.97
* Water subsidies SAP (Subsidio Agua Potable): The water subsidy provides an allowance for
the cost of consumption of up to 15 cubic meters per month. As noted by Gomez-Lobo and
Contreras (2000; see also Estache, Foster, and Wodon, forthcoming, for a review), the subsidy
was introduced in 1990 to reduce the impact of rising prices after the reform of the water
sector. The initial take-up of the program (i.e., the percentage of eligible households
participating in the program) was low in the first year, at 5 percent only, because the
eligibility threshold and the value of the subsidy were too low to make it worthwhile for
households to participate. To increase take-up, water companies were given the opportunity
to propose customers as potential subsidy recipients, which was in their interest in order to
increase payment rates. The subsidy covers from 20 percent to 85 percent of the bill for the
first 15 cubic meters of monthly consumption. MIDEPLAN uses regional data on water
consumption and tariffs, as well as socioeconomic conditions, to determine the funds made
available to each region. Within each region, subsidies are allocated to municipalities who
then determine household eligibility using the ficha CAS. As for other programs targeted
with theficha CAS, household eligibility is re-assessed every three years, and the subsidy can
be withdrawn by utilities if the household has more than three months of arrears in paying its
share of the bill.
* Social housing: The programs of vivienda bdsica and vivienda progresiva (etapas I -II)
provide subsidies for the construction of new housing units, or the improvement of existing
units. The amount of the subsidy is determined in UFs, which are monetary units.98 Apart
from eligibility criteria according to the ficha CAS, the households must contribute to the
construction costs and thereby provide evidence of savings when applying. The program is
important not only to satisfy basic needs, but also because the lack of safe and secure shelter
has been shown to reduce the ability of women to work because of their reluctance to leave
their children at home (risks of accidents in sub-standard housing, such as electrical shocks).
Good housing conditions are also essential for individuals involved in home-based wage
employment or micro-enterprise, and for reducing crowding and the associated social risks of
domestic violence.
* Child care: The childcare programs of the JUNJI and Fundaci6n INTEGRA are also targeted
using the ficha CAS. The programs provide care for children whose mothers are working.
Since vulnerable low-income women are more likely to be affected than men by exclusion
from the labor market and by poor quality of employment, this type of program for affordable
or even free childcare is important from a gender point of view and for building work
experience and incentives among poor women.
97 These figures refer to the period during which the micro-study in Huechuraba (See Section III) was implemented.
These amounts have changed since. For instance, in July 2001, the SUF is now worth 3452.
98 In 1998, one UF was worth approximately CP$460.
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A Quantitative Evaluation
This section provides a quantitative assessment of the targeting performance of the social
programs which are implemented nationally and for which we have information in the nationally
representative 1998 CASEN survey (Caracterizaci6n Socioecon6mica Nacional) implemented by
the Ministry of Planning MIDEPLAN.
There are various ways to evaluate quantitatively the targeting performance of the programs
whose eligibility is based on the ficha CAS. The most common measures of targeting
performance used in the literature are based on the so-called errors of inclusion and exclusion.
An error of inclusion is observed when a household which is not part of the program's target
population receives the program's benefits. An error of exclusion is observed when a household
which is part of the program's target population does not receive the program's benefits. This
approach for measuring targeting performance has been used among others by Gomez-Lobo and
Contreras (2000) for Chile's water subsidies. In this paper however, we use an alternative (and
arguably better) indicator of performance which takes into account not only who benefits from
social programs and who does not, but also to what extent various households benefits (the
program benefits may vary from one household to another). The method is explained in Box 5. 1,
and it relies on three key pararneters for understanding the impact of various programs on social
welfare:
* Gini income elasticity (GIE),: The overall impact on social welfare of changing at the margin
the budget allocated by the government to a given program is a function of the program's Gini
income elasticity (GIE hereafter). If the GIE is equal to one, a marginal increase in the
benefits will not affect the Gini coefficient in after-tax after-benefit per capita income, and
thereby the effect on social welfare can be considered as neutral (no change). If the GIE is
less (greater) than one, then an increase in program benefits will decrease (increase) the Gini
of income, and thereby increase (decrease) social welfare. The smaller the GIE, the larger the
redistributive impact of the program and the gains in social welfare. Importantly, since the
GIE is estimated for a dollar spent on the program, we can compare programs which are of
different scale in terrns of outlays.
The GIE can be decomposed into the product of a targeting elasticity and an allocation elasticity.
* Targeting elasticity: The targeting elasticity measures what would be the impact of a program
on social welfare if all those who benefit from the program were receiving exactly the same
benefit. In other words, the targeting elasticity provides the impact of pure targeting (who
gets the program and who does not) on social welfare. Lower and upper bounds can be
provided for the targeting elasticity, and these bounds depend on the share of the population
which participates in the program. The higher the share of participants in the population, the
closer the bounds. The intuition beyond this result is that it is easier to target a program to the
very poor when the share of the participants among the population is low. The practical
relevance of the bounds is that they enable an analyst to compare the targeting performance of
programs of different sizes.
* Allocation elasticity: The allocation elasticity measures the impact of social welfare of the
differences in the benefits received by various program participants. Lower and upper bounds
can also be provided for the allocation elasticity. The combination of the information
provided by the targeting and allocation elasticities enables the analyst to assess whether the
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good (bad) performance of a given program is due to good (bad) targeting or to a good (bad)
allocation of benefits among participants.
In the 1998 CASEN, it is feasible to estimate both the targeting and allocation elasticities for the
income transfers provided by PASIS, SUF, and the water subsidies. Additionally and for
comparison purposes, we also compute the targeting and allocation elasticities for another type of
means-tested family allowances which is different from SUF and does not rely on the ficha CAS
(according to the CASEN questionnaire, these allowances provide CP$3,025 for households with
gross income below CP$91,800, CP$2,943 for households with gross income between CP$91,800
and CP$186,747, and CP$1,000 for households with gross income between CP$186,747 and
CP$365,399). For the housing and child care programs, the information available in the CASEN
enables us to compute the targeting elasticity only because we do not have the amounts allocated
(or the cash value of the in-kind benefits), but the targeting elasticity should be fairly close to the
overall GIE because there are relatively few differences in benefits allocation between households
in these programs (the amounts for the housing allocations are fixed, and the child care benefits
only depend on the number of young children that a working mother may have).
The results of the estimation are provided in Table 1. To understand how Table 1 works, let's
consider the case of the pension assistance provided under PASIS. The table indicates that the
GIE for PASIS is -0.58, which is fairly low and hence highly redistributive (any elasticity below
one indicates that the corresponding program is redistributive; a negative elasticity implies a large
redistributive impact). The GIE for PASIS is equal to the product of the targeting elasticity (-
0.56) and the allocation elasticity (1.05). The fact that the allocation elasticity is close to one
suggests that there are few differences in pension benefits among PASIS participants. In other
words, the redistributive impact of the program comes from its good targeting based on theficha
CAS. As for the participation rate in the program of 6.1 percent, it determines (together with the
value of the overall Gini for per capita income of about 0.57) the lower and upper bounds for the
targeting and allocation elasticities. For comparison purposes, other sources of pension income
have been included in Table 1 even though these are not targeted through the ficha CAS and are
provided in many cases by private operators. Clearly, and as expected, the pension assistance
provided through PASIS is much more redistributive than other pensions.
More generally, two main conclusions can be drawn from Table 1:
* High overall redistributive impact, but differences between the various programs: All the
programs targeted according to the ficha CAS have a large redistributive impact per peso
spent. This is evidenced by the low values of the GIE elasticities for the income transfers and
water subsidies, and by the low values of the targeting elasticities for the housing and child
care programs (for these programs, we cannot compute an allocation elasticity, so that the GIE
remains unknown). Yet, some programs are better targeted than others. Among income and
other transfers, the SUF family allowances have the best performance, while water subsidies
have a somewhat lower performance. Among the other social programs, the child care
programs tend to be slightly better targeted than the housing programs, perhaps because of the
savings requirements required for participation in the later.
* Good targeting, with few differences in allocation: The redistributive impact of the programs
is due to their good targeting, which is based on the ficha CAS. The fact that the GIE tends to
be close to the targeting elasticity (because the allocation elasticities are close to one) suggests
few differences in the amount of benefits received from the various programs by different
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households. Only in the case of water do we have an allocation elasticity well below one,
probably because those who consume more water and thereby receive more subsidies tend to
be higher up in the distribution of income.
Table 1: Gini Income Elasticity of Social Programs Targeted According to the Ficha CAS
Income transfer programs and water subsidies
Non-PASIS Pension Family Water
pensions assistance allowances subsidies
(not targeted) PASIS SUF
Gini income elasticity (GEE) 0.91 -0.58 -1.03 -0.35
Pr3gramparticipationratep 15.7% 6.1% 11.5% 6.4%
M-an allocation received 7634.04 503.16 155.68 47.61
Oi"erall Gini for per capita income Gy 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
Targeting elasticity
Lcwer bound -1.49 -1.66 -1.56 -1.65
Actual value 0.47 -0.56 -0.95 -0.43
Upper bound 1.49 1.66 1.56 1.65
Allocation elasticity
Lower bound -1.19 -1.06 -1.13 -1.07
A:tual value 1.91 1.05 1.09 0.80
Upper bound 1.19 1.06 1.13 1.07
Other targeted programs
Housing Housing Housing Child care Child care
Viv. Basica Viv. Prog I Viv. Prog II JUNJI INTEGRA
Gini income elasticity NA NA NA NA NA
Programparticipationratep 5.8% 1.1% 0.2% 1.7% 1.3%
Overall Gini for per capita income Gy 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
Targeting elasticity
Lower bound -1.66 -1.74 -1.76 -1.73 -1.74
Ai,tual value at individual (per capita) level -0.41 -0.68 -0.59 -0.50 -0.71
Al,tual value at household level -0.32 -0.54 -0.48 -0.44 -0.65
UUper bound 1.66 1.74 1.76 1.73 1.74
Sc urce: Authors' estimation using 1998 CASEN survey.
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Box 1: METHODOLOGY FOR THE QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION
To assess the impact on welfare of government programs per dollar spent in each program, we
Wodon and Yitzhaki (2000). Denote by y the mean income in the population and by G the Gini index of
income inequality. A common welfare function used in the literature is W= y (l-G). The higher the mean
income, the higher the level of social welfare, but the higher the inequality, the lower the aggregate level
of welfare. This welfare function takes into account not only absolute, but also relative deprivation
(people assess their own level of welfare in part by comparing themselves with others). Using the implicit
distributional weights embodied in this welfare function, we can derive the marginal gains from additional
investments in government programs. If x denotes the mean benefit of a social program x across the
whole population, and if ii is the Gini income elasticity of that program (defined below), increasing at the
margin the funds allocated to the program by multiplying the outlays by 1 + A for all program participants,
with A small, will result in a marginal social welfare gain equal to:
dW= (x A)(J -r7 G) (1)
Equation (1) makes it clear that considerations related to both growth (as represented by the mean
marginal benefit x A) and distribution (as represented by the Gini income elasticity 77 times the Gini index
G) must be taken into account in program evaluations. The Gini income elasticity q (hereafter GIE)
measures the impact of an increase of one dollar, distributed as a constant percentage change in the
benefits of the program, on income or consumption inequality. Denoting by x the household (per capita)
benefit from the program, by y income, by F(y) the cumulative distribution of income, and by x- the mean
benefits of the program over the entire population, the GIE is:
_ cov(x, F(y)) -(17 y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~(2)
cov(y, F(y)) x
If the elasticity equals one, a marginal increase in benefits will not affect the Gini coefficient in
after-tax after-benefit income. If the elasticity is less (greater) than one, then an increase in benefits will
decrease (increase) the Gini of income. The smaller the elasticity, the larger the redistributive impact of
the program and the gains in welfare. Since the GIE is estimated for a dollar spent on the program, we
can compare programs which are of different scale in terms of outlays. A decomposition of the GIE can
be used to differentiate between two properties of a program that can affect its impact on welfare:
targeting and the allocation mechanism among participants (internal progressivity). The decomposition
enables the analyst to assess whether the (lack of) performance of social programs and policies is due to
either the selection mechanism for participants or the allocation of benefits among program participants.
To differentiate between targeting and internal progressivity, define z as the targeting instrument:
x p if h E P)z=7 if ho ) (3)
That is, z is equal to the mean benefit among participants for households who participate in the
program and it is zero for households who do not participate (one could substitute the average benefit by
an indicator which is equal to one without affecting the results.) The variable z is an indicator of targeting
because it is only concerned with whom is affected by the program, rather than with the actual benefit
received. Using this definition of z, we can rewrite the GEE as a product of two elasticities as follows:
( cov(z, F(y)) y)(cov(x, F(y)) = (4)( cov(y, F(y)) z ) cov(z, F(y)) x
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B ox 1 (continued)
The first term is related to the targeting of the program (targeting effect). The second term is the
pr-ogressivity among participants (allocation effect)The distributional impact of a program depends on the
pr-oduct of its targeting and allocation elasticities. Good targeting, for examnple, can be offset by a bad
allocation mechanism among program beneficiaries. Equation (6) is useful to assess whether the (lack of)
pi,rformance of a program is due to its targeting or to the allocation of benefits among beneficiaries. But
one can go further by establishing bounds for the values of the targeting and allocation elasticities.
Specifically, the minimum and maximum values of the targeting elasticity depend on the share the
population participating in the program and the overall Gini. Denoting by p the share of the population
participating in the program, and by Gy the overall Gini, it can be shown that:
O-( P) < vTS P).(5
-- 
7?T < •
Gy Gy
The lower bound increases with the proportion of the population reached by the program and the
level of income inequality. The relationship between the lower bound and the share of program
participants is straightforward. The more households the program reaches, the less effective targeting can
be because each additional participating household makes it more difficult to focus resources on the
pcorest. If all households participate, p=1 and the lower bound is zero. The fact that the targeting
capacity declines with the overall level of inequality is perhaps more surprising, because one might expect
th,it the higher the inequality, the higher the potential for redistribution through targeting. The intuitive
explanation is that the higher the inequality, the further apart households are from each other, so that
adding a small amount of resources to the program participants does not reduce inequality by a lot
(remember that the elasticities capture the impact on inequality and social welfare on e per dollar basis). A
similar reasoning applies for the intuition regarding the upper bound, and the two bounds are symmetric
around zero.
Lower and upper bounds can also be provided for the allocation elasticity. As shown in the
appendix, the minimum and maximum values of the allocation elasticity depend on the share the
population participating in the program, but not on the overall Gini:
- < IA ' (6)(l- p) (l-p)
As the share of the population participating in the program increases, the interval for the allocation
elasticity increases as well, because a higher participation rates provides more opportunities for
differentiation in the allocation of the benefits among participants of the program. It is important to note
thEt the interpretation of what a good elasticity need not be the same for the targeting and allocation
elasticities. In the case of the targeting' elasticity, one would hope to obtain an elasticity below zero, which
wculd indicate a good targeting performance. But if the targeting elasticity is below zero, one would hope
to have an allocation elasticity above zero in order to keep the overall elasticity negative. At In reverse, if
the targeting elasticity is positive, suggesting bad targeting, one would hope to have a negative allocation
elasticity. It should also be emphasized that the interpretation of the upper and lower bounds for both
elasticities changes depending on. whether we are dealing with taxes or transfers. In the case of targeting
for example, when comparing transfers, the lower bound is typically the best that can be achieved, while
when dealing with taxes, it is the upper bound that one would like to reach. Note finally that equations (5)
and (6) enable us in principle to compare the targeting and allocation effectiveness of programs with
difFerent participation rate, since the bounds depend on that participation rate. (The role played by the
overall per capita income Gini in the bounds for the targeting elasticity is less important since the Gini is
identical for all programs at any given point in time.)
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Qualitative Evaluation: An Actor-Oriented Approach
The quantitative evaluation provided in the previous suggests that the programs targeted
according to the ficha CAS have a good redistributive impact. This does not mean, however, that
there are no problems or challenges with the ficha CAS targeting or with the outreach of the
various programs. In this section, in order to go beyond our quantitative results, we present
findings from an exploratory study on poverty, access to government programs, and social
exclusion in Chile conducted in 1998 by Clert (2000a, 2000b). Using an actor-oriented approach,
the research used both quantitative and qualitative methods (see Box 2) to explore the priorities,
experience and perceptions of three sets of actors concerned with poverty reduction: a) the
government leadership; b) the residents of Huechuraba, a socially disadvantaged Comuna of
Greater Santiago, and c) public agents involved at different levels of policy formulation and
implementation. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the views from households and
social workers.
Box 2: METHODOLOGY FOR THE QUALITATIVE EVALUATION
Much of the research on social exclusion is done without consultation with those who experience
social disadvantage and those who formulate and implement social policies. The qualitative evaluation of
the ficha CAS presented here is part of a broader study on poverty and social policy in Chile carried out by
Clert (2000b) using an actor-oriented methodology. The research was carried within a social exclusion
framework which recognizes the multidimensionality of poverty (e.g., the connection between
distributional and relational dimensions), the role of institutional factors in the generation of social
disadvantage, and its time and spatial aspects. More specifically, the research explored the priorities,
experience and perceptions of three sets of actors concerned with poverty reduction; a) the residents of
Huechuraba, a socially disadvantaged district of Santiago through a micro study; b) local and central
government staff concerned with poverty reduction at different levels of the state apparatus, through
interviews and focus groups, and c) the government leadership, through a study of official policy
documents and discourse. This methodology allowed to confront central government priorities with the
reality of poverty and social exclusion, as experienced and perceived by both Huechuraba's residents and
the social practitioners implementing the policies. The fieldwork was carried out between December 1997
and June 1998.
The Micro-Study of the Residents of Huechuraba
The study of the residents of Huechuraba took place between December 1997 and May 1998. The
research included an area survey, a small household survey, and qualitative interviews.
Area survey. The micro-study started with a comuna survey. Like traditional 'community surveys', it
aimed at identifying the characteristics of the area. Given the complex and multidimensional questions
raised by a social exclusion perspective, this entailed going beyond the usual area profile used in poverty
assessments. It also required a review of secondary resources and an extensive use of key informant
interviews: 25 key informant interviews were conducted in December 1997 (13 municipal agents including
managers of programs, departments and one administrator; five agents involved in service provision; five
social leaders of community-based organizations; two NGO representatives; and one resident who had
lived in a poor sector of the comuna for the last thirty years).
The household survey. The survey was based on a stratified random sample of 88 households living in
Huechuraba. Given the spatial heterogeneity of the comuna, the stratified sample was used to ensure the
adequate representation of all neighborhood units and campamentos (informal settlements). However,
given the focus of the study on social disadvantage, the most well-off area of the comuna was excluded
from the survey. Regarding respondents, the female head of household or the female partner of the male
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id entified as the head of household was chosen for the interviews. If the head of household was a male
living by himself or with children, then he was the respondent. Despite the preference for female
rospondents for practical and methodological reasons, the research also saw the importance of including
male respondents in order to elicit differences in the experience of social disadvantage between men and
women. In the end, there were 18 men out of a total of 88 respondents. In terms of content, the
questionnaire aimed at getting infornation on labor market participation and access to social entitlements
(s;ocial programs, benefits, social services), as well as organizational and relational issues relevant for the
s,)cial exclusion perspective adopted (e.g., participation in organizations, level of information on social
e rititlements, reliance on social networks for the provision of care). The questionnaire was divided between
questions on the respondent herself, and questions regarding other household members, which aimed at
c apturing intra-household differences. After completion of the survey, the data was entered and analyzed
using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Basic frequencies and cross-tabulations
h -lped in selecting interviewees for the sub-sample qualitative interviews.
Qualitative interviews. The household survey was followed by a sub-sample of 24 semi-
siructured interviews. A 25 percent non-random sub-sample of the original questionnaires was
si,-ected, ensuring that the sub-sample was as representative as possible of the overall profile
found in the household survey. In order to better capture intra-household differences and a wide
range of experiences of exclusion, the household head was not always chosen as the interviewee.
In order to elicit gender-based differences, a little more than a third of the interviews were
c :nducted with men, and on three occasions the choice was made to interview separately both the
niale and the female partners within the same household. The semi-structured interviews aimed
at exploring subtle visible mechanisms of exclusion such as perceptions of exclusion and/or
discrimination on the basis of specific elements of identity (e.g., age, gender, place of residence)
aad causal relationships suggested by the preliminary results from the quantitative data analysis
of the larger household survey. The interviews focused on capturing the personal experience and
tlie perceptions of exclusion/inclusion of the interviewees in areas identified in the survey
questionnaire, including, for instance, the job interview process when searching for employment
and the perceptions of the quality and accessibility of various social entitlements. Each interview
ended with a participatory exercise in the form of a Venn Diagram, which was used to highlight
perceptions of social and institutional relationships. Derived from Participatory Rural Appraisal
(!'.R.A.) methods and based on the drawing of circles, this exercise asks whether there exist
different actors or institutions that are relevant to participants in terms of their capacity to help
and/or care for them in times of trouble. It also allows inquiring into the perceived caring and
helping capacity of these actors and institutions.
Focus groups and interviews with public agents
The key criterion for the selection of public agents was to obtain the insights of agents located at
different stages of the policy process, from the level of local implementation and practice to the level of
cmntral policy formulation and agenda setting. On this basis, the choice was made to select professionals
within the municipality of Huechuraba as well as central government officials. The research used different
qualitative techniques for the two types of agents. The interviews were conducted in June 1998.
Local government staff. The Huechuraba municipality was similar to other local government structures
in that the unit for 'community Development' DIDECO (Direcci6n para el Desarrollo Communitario) was
re sponsible for social development and poverty reduction. Therefore, most of the agents interviewed were
located there. Since the micro-study had already provided an opportunity to interview middle managers
a-d social planners, only three local officials were selected and the focus was
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placed on agents located at lower hierarchical echelons of the municipality, i.e., social workers and welfare
assistants (tecnico-sociales) for the welfare (Atenci6n Social) and housing sub-units. This choice was
made mainly for two reasons: a) the positions of the agents placed them in direct contact with
disadvantaged residents; and b) the agents occupy a key place in the minds of disadvantaged residents, as
identified by the micro-study. In terms of techniques, focus groups (four in total) were used for social
workers, welfare assistants and CAS surveyors since they were sufficiently numerous and homogeneous in
their educational level and the tasks they performed. Additionally, four semi-structured interviews were
used for local managers located at a higher hierarchical level.
Central government staff. There were two key criteria for the selection of these agents. First, senior
civil servants had to be closely involved in the process of policy formulation and agenda-setting, and also
directly involved with the government's anti-poverty strategy. Second, the position of the civil servants
needed to allow them to discuss different aspects of the government's anti-poverty strategy, from overall
orientations and priorities to social policy methods and planning. Nine policy advisors and planners
located at the Ministries of Finance, Planning, Labor (Institute of Vocational training SENCE), Women
and the Secretariat of the Presidency were selected. Semi-structured interviews were used.
The View from the Households
Clert's micro-study showed that exclusion from safety nets and other social entitlements strongly
relates to lack of access to information. Three key findings emerged from the household
quantitative survey as to the degree of information on social entitlements among household heads
or spouses living in the comuna of Huechuraba. First, on average, the proportion of respondents
who declared not having heard at all of the social entitlement under review was relatively high, at
51 percent of the sample. Second, this proportion varied depending on the kind of social
entitlements. It reached 74 percent for benefits such as municipal programs in health and
education which provide safety nets (e.g., free provision of medicine or material help for the
buying of the school uniform). It was also high for the main national program against poverty
among women-headed households, since 70 percent of the female respondents had not heard of
the program at all. The awareness rates were better for social funds (which tend to be promoted
through radio and TV), and vocational training classes which have been for long a priority of both
central and local governments. However, even when the respondents had heard of the social
entitlements, a large share did not know how to apply to these benefits. For instance, among the
respondents who knew about the existence of vocational training courses, half did not know how
to apply for these courses. Given the fact that the survey was carried in a poor neighborhood
whose inhabitants are primary targets for the government's programs, this lack of information is
probably detrimental to the success of the programs.
One way to analyze the causes of the poor transmission of information to the programs' potential
beneficiaries is to look at the ways 'informed' respondents gained their knowledge. Taking the
example of the government's income transfers (subsidios monetarios), Figure 1 points to four
ways in which information was obtained by households on these programs. The most frequent
sources of information were close contacts such as friends, family and neighbors (43 percent of
the total number of informed respondents). More official actors such as municipal social workers
or health centers rank second, contributing to 37 percent of the informed respondents. Among
these more official sources of information, the impact of direct visits to the home of respondent
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by a social workers was large. Social organizations such as neighborhood associations were at
the source of information on government programs in only 6 percent of the cases. Finally, more
distant modes of information such as posters or radio announcements accounted for only 5
percent of the inforned respondents.
Figure 1: Sources of Information on Income Transfers Among Poor Households
How did you get to know these benefits?
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Source: Households Survey in Clert (2000a, 2000b). Share of respondents
These findings suggests that three main causes may be at the source of the lack of information
abaut social entitlements among the poor. First, the isolation of some among the poor from social
networks (e.g., family and neighbors) may reduce access to information. Second, the lack or
irr-gularity of visits to the municipal centers of information by the poor may also reduce their
exposure to information. Third, the fact that only a minority of households benefit from
spontaneous home visits by social worker also reduces the likelihood of being informed (many of
these visits are organized during barridos which are general 'sweeps' of an area). Although
statistics such as those provided in Figure 1 cannot claim conclusive causal links, they do raised
concerns about the mobility of public actors such as social workers who need to be in close
contact with those among the poor who experience social isolation and disadvantage the most.
Focus group discussions with practitioners from Huechuraba confirmed the concern regarding the
lack of mobility and outreach among social workers. The social workers and tecnico-sociales
called themselves for more mobile initiatives (such as the barridos) in order to better identify
existing needs rather than solely responding to demands from applicants coming to the
minicipality. As a social worker sumnmed it up: "We need more people on the ground,
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accompanying processes. Before the integration of people into social programs, you need to
make an assessment of who might need these programs. This is the opposite of what we're doing
now in most cases, which is to wait for the demand to come and help people benefit from the
program."
Another important finding of the study was that the rejection of the respondents' applications for
different social entitlements was directly linked to them obtaining an inadequate number of points
on the means-testing instrument ficha CAS. This was reported by a majority of unsuccessful
respondents who had applied for one or more of the following social entitlements: the gratuity
card (also named tarjeta de indigencia) which allows free access to public health facilities, the
income transfers, the low-cost housing (mainly vivienda basica) and the access to public childcare
centers (mainly through the JUNJI). The emphasis of the ficha CAS on material possessions
may overlook the risks which households can be faced with and which can make them vulnerable.
The examples of Maria and Margarita can make this clear.
* Maria, who was 52 at the time of her interview with the CAS surveyor, was without any
source of income other than the help of her children. A sudden illness in her spine prevented
her from working. Separated from her husband, she was unable to obtain a pension from him.
She was responsible for her eldest daughter who suffered from a psychiatric illness and for
her daughter's child. She applied for a small pension, but the points she scored on the ficha
CAS at the screening test were found to be too high, as she recalls: "They came to see me, she
asked me if I had a washing machine -yes I do I said to her, 'do you have a centrifuge
machine' - yes I do, 'refrigerator' - yes I do, 'Right Madam, she said, 'you don't have any
right to a pension'. "
* Margarita recalled that her daughter was hospitalized and that she needed the indigence card
since she could not afford the cost of the medical attention. Her daughter's illness had
coincided with Margarita's loss of her job, and she had been unemployed for two months at
the time of the visit of the CAS surveyor. She explains: "When she came here, she found me
better than I am now.... In those years and because I had been working, I had my floor
impeccable. Inclusively I wasn 't polishing the floor with wax but with brown shoe product.
So it looked really shiny.... She was looking everywhere and so she told me, just like that: how
could I buy floor wax if I didn't have money to cook and to meet my expenses. I told her it
was illogical, since it was two months that I was out of work, but when I was working, I had
bought the wax. And my little plants, my little things... With time, I had been buying them and
so now that I was in need, without a job, I wasn't going to take out a piece of the table, or a
bit of the armchair. This, she didn't understand.... I told her: 'You mix up poverty with
cleanliness. I'm poor I said, maybe I don't have a lot to put into the casserole. Yet I have a
rag, I said, and I still have something to clean. "
These examples show that both applicants were unable to generate any income, so that they were
becoming highly vulnerable, one through her illness and the other through the loss of her job.
While their life events justified external support to prevent them from falling further into poverty,
the rules of targeting excluded them from such support because a presumption of well-being was
9 From a gender perspective, exclusion from public childcare centers constitutes a contradiction between the priority
assigned to female labor-market insertion and the use of exclusionary rules of selection by the Public Institution for
Childcare in Chile (JUNJI). At the national level, SERNAM has managed to remove the exclusionary rule for
women heads of households, but the new rules have not yet filtered to the local level. Furthermore, it seems that the
rule still applies to women who were not household heads.
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based on their possession of a number of assets. Margarita's reasoning suggests a logic for the
granting of government support which contrasts with the more rigid criteria of the ficha CAS
instrument.
The View From Social Workers and Welfare Assistants
D-awing on interviews and focus-group discussions with local staff, Clert (2000a, 2000b) also
aralyzed the experiences and perceptions of municipal professionals in direct contact with
disadvantaged citizens. The social workers and welfare assistants (tecnico-socialesl°) who use
th- means-testing instrument provided by the ficha CAS in their daily work mention their
fristration with the rigidity of the eligibility criteria associated with theficha CAS. Following on
sit e visits and in-depth interviews with residents, they would at times conclude that assistance was
nceded without being able to offer it because of the results of the CAS point system. As one
social worker put it: "social reality is much more dynamic, changing and complex than the
criteria." Or as a tecnico-social reflected: "Criteria are designedfor extreme situations, but in
practice most situations are not as extreme... The CAS surveyor might tell us the lady earns
1 00, 000 pesos. Right, but she must pay for rent, water, electricity and food. This will never be
er!ough for four people! "
Local level staff stressed in focus groups the need for less focus on material possessions such as a
cc,lor TV, the type of roof materials and the like. Questions relating to possessions were seen as
outdated, given 'the overall development of the country' and 'people's easy access to goods such
a:v a refrigerator... through credit facilities'. Another argument was that possessions deflected
attention from the central issue of the applicant's means of livelihood. A 'more relevant way to
awsess poverty', would be 'to ask if and how people manage to make ends meet'. Thcnico-sociales
also mentioned that low-income sectors often improve the quality of their house and equipment
b low-cost, self-help means. Therefore, such improvements do not necessarily reflect an
increase in income or security. Rather, they reflect people's desire to 'have a better life' and to
g,in greater dignity. Ticnico-sociales also noted that rigid criteria could end up making people
more vulnerable to destitution and long-term insecurity. By denying state financial support, the
emphasis on enumerating possessions in targeting indirectly left people with no other option than
to sell their assets 'in order to survive'. Finally, local staff made a number of suggestions for
iniproving the targeting system of theficha CAS:
* Indicators of vulnerability: Professionals suggested to pay greater attention to vulnerability
indicators so as not to exclude people who are in need of assistance even though they may
appear to be non-poor on a assets basis. As one professional put it: 'surveyors ask how
much do you make a month? They don't ask what kind of job people do, what kind of
contract they have, if they have one'. The recommendation from social workers would be to
pay more attention to labor market exclusion.
o Private transfers: Local staff pointed.to the dangers associated with the way the CAS form
takes into account private transfers (e.g., from relatives and friends) registered under the
category 'ayuda de terceros'. CAS surveyors must translated private transfers, whether in
kind or in cash, into an average monthly income. Imposed by MIDEPLAN rules and long
before by the former military regime, this obligation originates in the assumption that
benefit claimants tend to lie about their actual sources of livelihood. While local staff
10) The 'social technicians' are welfare assistants who, unlike social workers, do not have a university degree.
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recognized that this could be true for a certain proportion of claimants, they also warned
against hasty generalizations. They suggested that such rules ended up distorting the reality
and reliability of people's survival strategies and needs. As one worker put it:
"Why can't they believe that some people don't have any money to live? You oftenfind an
older woman who tells you "seinorita, ... I don 't do any pololitosl'l, I've got nothing". So, the
surveyor asks "but what do you live on then seniora "? So she says "my son brings me a kilo
ofrice..., my neighbor offers me a kilo of sugar and pieces of bread". The surveyor
transforms all this into money and her points increase. But then, the seinora explains
"because I'm on my own, if the neighbor gives me three pieces of bread, I eat half of it at
lunch time because sometimes I get nothing else to eat. Then I eat the other half I still keep
some for the day after and sometimes I eat bread that is two days old ". It's real, people have
told me this and I've been able to observe it so often in my site visits.... But sometimes the
surveyor only heard "look the neighbor offers me two pieces of bread a day"!"
Such experiences lead some tecnico-sociales to push for reflecting as faithfully as possible the
applicants' own words in this area and for avoiding mechanical assumptions for the valuation of
private transfers.
* Intra-household allocations: A third area of reform suggested by professionals was the need
for CAS means-testing methods to recognize intra-household allocations. This is particularly
important from a gender perspective, and it can be illustrated with a reference to pregnant
teenagers. Classified as dependants, they end up being excluded from maternity benefits.
Unable to afford a place of their own, these future single mothers are assumed to benefit from
their parents' support but as a tecnico-social put it:
"We 're talking about a pregnant kid who needs a bit of support here... ! Fair enough, her
parents might help her a bit, somehow, sometimes. But sometimes parents also reject them,
tell them off.. So the girls come to the municipality for help but there 's no support there
either... "
The assumption of the parents' support is all the more worrying in the Chilean context as many
studies have pointed to the strong stigmatization attached to teenage pregnancy (Latorre et al,
1996).
Training of surveyors: Fourth and lastly, the professionals raised the need for better training
of the surveyors themselves and for a better sensitization to the issues outlined above.
The Changes Introduced in September 1999: Achievements and Persisting Challenges
In 1999, there was an official recognition of some of the limitations of the targeting system of
CAS, with particular emphasis on the outdated character of variables such as the presence of a
television and the like. The MIDEPLAN (1999) report on the modernization of the CAS system
clearly stated that "in the last 13 years, the current (CAS) Model had lost most of its ability to
identify eligible population among the poor across the socio-economic spectrum". Based on
mathematic simulation models, the Government introduced three key changes to the CAS system.
First, the revised CAS system dropped the questions of electricity access (under the housing
101 Pololito is a colloquial name for casual work or temporary job.
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fiactor) and of TV access (under material assets or patrimonio), which are no longer considered to
reflect poverty since an increasing number of households have access to those goods. Second,
different systems for rural and urban areas were eliminated and merged into a single, national
a,sessment. Third, it introduced a revised system of weights and scaling of the various factors.
In the new model and as illustrated in Table 2 below, the weights for housing increased despite
the elimination of electricity access. In the newly created factor Income-Assets (Ingreso
fitmiliar/Patrimonio), the weight Income sub-factor lowers while the overall equipment/material
a3sets increases. The weights for the factors education (years of schooling) and occupation of the
head of dwelling unit remain overall the same.
Table 2. Relative Weights of Each Variable in the revised CAS SYSTEM
Orinal Model Revised Model
Factor Variables Urban Rural National
Wall 3.92% 4.01% 3.64%
Floor 1.96% 2.00% 3.64%
Roof 3.92% 4.01% 3.12%
Housing Crowding 2.44% 2.50% 5.72%
Water 3.67% 3.76% 3.46%
Sanitation 4.89% 5.01% 2.96%
Tub-shower 1.22% 1.25% 3.46%
Electricity 2.44% 2.50%
Total, housing
24.46 25.04 26.00
Education Education, HH head 8.96% 20.33% 25.00%
Occupation Highest Job Status of Couple 22.12% 24.94% 22.00%
Income Per capita family income 24.58% 25.04% 11.61%
House and Lot (owned) 15.87% 3.70% 3.51%
Assets TV 1.35% 0.31%
Refrigerator 1.31% 0.30% 5.94%
Water Heater 1.31% 0.30% _ 5.94%
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
5ource: MIDEPLAN (1999:39).
l7he elimination of TV access and electricity access certainly are achievements towards a better
targeting performance. Trials of the new system indicate that the revised system it is more
effective in identifying the poor, and the non-poor, and therefore preventing errors of inclusion of
the non-poor in social programs. For instance, MIDEPLAN (1999: 36) reported that in the
revised system, 53.1 % of families would see their level of points lowered i.e. become classified
aLs "poorer" while 46.9% would see theirs increase. In terms of implications for access to
benefits, the proportion of families with a total number of points lower than 550, that is those
families entitled to the benefits described in section I above, increases from 22% (908,223) in the
old model to 26.6% ( 1,096,973) in the revised model.
Nevertheless, concerns can also be raised. While errors of inclusion may be diminished, errors
of exclusion of poor and vulnerable households could still occur. On the revised quantitative
model in particular, it is notewoi-thy that key indicators of need and vulnerability are still not
102incorporated into the CAS system, such as issues of intra-household allocations; precariousness
102 The occupation factor remains the occupation of the head of the dwelling unit.
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of the type of occupation;10 3 degree of indebtedness; and illness. Private transfers, whether in
cash or in kind, even if minimal, are still registered under the category 'ayuda de terceros' and
translated into an average monthly income. Finally, findings from the Huechuraba study and
interviewees with practitioners suggested that possible errors of exclusion should be measured not
only quantitatively but also qualitatively. However, the methods used have been exclusively
quantitative mathematic simulation models.
The Impact of Additional Eligibility Criteria: Housing and Child Care
Despite significant achievements, some additional rules used for determining eligibility to social
services also have exclusionary effects. In the eligibility rules used by the Ministry of Housing
SERVIU for its own programs, the information provided by the ficha CAS is only one element
among others. Specifically, applicants with an adequate number of CAS points cannot be eligible
if they do not meet required level of savings (Table 1). Affordability, therefore, is a key obstacle.
As one worker put it for the program of basic housing (vivienda basica): 'This programme is
frustrating... It's supposed to be targeted at the poorest yet people with no saving capacity can't
have access to it. '
The difficulties encountered by households for benefiting from public housing programs can also
be illustrated with the examples of the so-called allegados. These are self-help organizations in
which people collectively advocate for public housing and pool their savings towards this end.104
Group-based housing applications have been encouraged by the post-1990 Chilean democratic
governments. But allegados are more likely to succeed in getting low-cost houses for their
members if they all have the same savings capacity, and apart from being unable to be successful
in their own application for the government's housing programs, many tenants can't even save
enough to be part of allegados committees. In a household interview, the secretary of one
allegados committee suggested that some directivas (rules from the association's board) put
pressure to keep out those with precarious or insufficient saving capacities. The selection process
of membership deserves to be quoted in detail:
The secretary: There is a minimum to get into the scheme. We were around 50, but this was
still useless. Either people didn't have the money or they couldn't be reached .... So we
started to eliminate people.
The interviewer: How did you select your people then?
The secretary: We started to ask for money, they had to give us a certain amount of money by
a certain deadline. We went to every address we had, explained what we were doing .... In
the end, we only kept 15 out of the 50. They were those who really had the money and all their
papers in order.
The interviewer: How much did they need to be selected?
The secretary: We put a minimum of $300,000 (i.e., more than four times the minimum wage.)
103 MIDEPLAN had initially proposed another alternative model for the calculation of CAS, incorporating new
variables such as access to health insurance and pensions -as part of the job contract -under the occupation factor.
However, incorporating new variables would have required to apply the CAS survey again and these administrative
and financial costs were considered too high at the time (MIDEPLAN, 1999).
104 The term refers to a housing status in which the allegado is allowed by the person who officially owns or rents the
'house to live under the same roof without paying a rent, although they sometimes share bills and other costs.
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The inability to save is particularly widespread among the low-income elderly because they are
no longer able to generate new income. This makes it difficult for them to receive help for the
intprovement of the quality of their homes, which in turn makes them more vulnerable to health
risks (e.g. exposure to the cold and deficient sanitary services) and social risks (exposure to theft
ard aggression). To some extent, the rules used for access to housing programs also exclude
w)men. Although women heads of households are usually given an additional 10 points in their
application for social housing, the women who were previously married and whose ex-husbands
owvn a house are not entitled to apply for social housing because the government benefit is only
given once and to the family rather than to the individual.
Aiother example of exclusionary 'rules can be observed with regards to childcare. Apart from
having the adequate number of points in the CAS index, the mother of the child must show proof
of' employment and associated working hours. This criteria tends to exclude three categories of
women: teenage mothers who wished they could complete their schooling instead of entering the
lalbor market; women involved in precarious employment with irregular working hours such as
cl' aners or domestic workers; and most of all, female job-seekers whose mobility ends up being
considerably restricted.'0 5
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Thle quantitative evaluation of the targeting performance of the government programs whose
eligibility rules are based on the scoring system of theficha CAS suggests that the scoring system
is effective in identifying the poor and in helping to maximize the redistributive impact of state-
funded pension assistance, family allowances, water subsidies, housing subsidies, and childcare
programs. While some progranls are better targeted than others, all programs are rather
slLccessful at channeling resources to the poor and very poor. This does not mean, however, that
the ficha CAS system does not have some weaknesses. Several of these weaknesses have been
revealed by the qualitative evaluation. In this conclusion, we would like to highlight a few
recommendations for improving Chile's targeting system.
Ir. order to improve the impact of the government's income transfers and social programs, it may
b4, necessary for government agents to get closer to the poor. Two suggestions can be provided.
F rst, it may be useful to implement a more effective communication strategy since it appears that
the poor still lack access to the relevant information about the various programs. Many poor
households do not know about the existence of the programs, and among the households who are
aware of the programs, many do not know how to apply for benefits. Second, it may be useful to
encourage more contacts between the poor and social workers. Beyond the reception of
ap plications at the municipal welfare office, initiatives such as the "sweeping" of areas could be
encouraged, so a to reach those among the poor who have weak connections to municipal
ir.stitutions. Better contacts between social workers and the poor may also help if social workers
are given some latitude to depart from the strict scoring system of the ficha CAS in order to
respond to situations of vulnerability which are not well measured by the simple possession of
assets.
'°0 Women involved in illegal activities -mainly prostitution- are also systematically excluded and therefore miss any
chances of reinsertion opportunities through the possibility for instance, to attend training courses.
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Related to this last point about vulnerability, more emphasis could be placed in the ficha CAS
system on the prevention as opposed to the alleviation of poverty. Targeting rules for centrally
financed income transfers and other social programs could be revised so as to prevent the fall of
vulnerable people into a vicious circle of loss. This is especially important in a context of high
unemployment rates which tends to provoke brutal changes in the lives of the poor. The means-
testing approach of the ficha CAS may lead to the exclusion of households in need of assistance
when the CAS criteria fail to adequately measure the dynamic and complex reality of deprivation.
The emphasis on material possessions could be reduced in the CAS in order to make place for
indicators such as the loss of a job or a sudden illness.
Another finding from the qualitative research refers to the need to adapt eligibility rules in order
to better take into account intra-household allocation patterns. Paying attention to individual
needs in the household also cuts across the variable of age. This was illustrated by the difficulty
for pregnant teenagers to gain access to maternal benefits when they live in larger households.
The potential for gender discrimination also exists in the access rules to means-tested housing and
child care. Another group which may not be covered well enough is the low income elderly,
especially when informal private transfers are taken into account by CAS surveyors in order to
determine eligibility for pension assistance.
Finally, from a methodological point of view, this paper has illustrated the benefits of going
beyond quantitative assessments for the evaluation of targeting instruments. On the basis of
quantitative simulation models,'06 the Chilean government recently introduced some
modifications to the ficha CAS, including a lesser emphasis on possessions. But the system still
has limits which tend to be overlooked by government officials. One more recommendation
emerging from this paper would be to collect in a systematic and periodic way the views and
opinions not only of the local staff who actually implement means-testing on the basis of the CAS
form, but also of poor and/or vulnerable households themselves.
'06 MIDEPLAN (1999).
C/!ile's High Growth Economy: Poverty and Income Distribution. 1987-1998 161
REFERENCES
C].ert, C. 1996. "Genero, Pobreza y Exclusi6n Social en Chile," SERNAM Working Paper 54.
Santiago de Chile.
C.ert, C. 2000a. "Policy Implications of a Social Exclusion Perspective in Chile: Priorities,
Discourse and Methods in Question. " Ph.D. thesis. London School of Economics.
Ci ert, C. 2000b. "Social Exclusion, Gender and the Chilean Government's Anti-Poverty
Strategy: Priorities and Methods in Question." In E. Gacitua Mario and C. Sojo, Editors,
Social Exclusion and Poverty Reduction in Latin America. Washington, DC.: World Bank
and FLACSO
Es,tache, A., V. Foster, and Q. Wodon. Forthcoming. Infrastructure Reform and the Poor.
Washington, DC.: World Bank.
G )mez-Lobo, A., and D. Contreras. 2000. "Subsidy Policies for the Utility Industries: A
Comparison of the Chilean and Colombian Water Subsidy Schemes." University of Chile,
Department of Economics, Santiago de Chile.
MIDEPLAN, 1999. Estudio del factor discriminatorio de la ficha CAS. Propuesta del
mejoramiento del calculo de puntaje, Santiago
MIDEPLAN, 1998. Programas y Subsidios Sociales de Gobierno Priorizados Mediante Ficha
CAS-2, Santiago de Chile.
UNDP, 1998, Informe Sobre la Seguridad Humana en Chile, Santiago de Chile.
WA'orld Wodon, Q., and S. Yitzhaki, 2000, Evaluating the Impact of Governrent Programs on
Social Welfare: The Role of Targeting and the Allocation Rules Among
Program.Beneficiaries. Washington DC.: World Bank.
APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTION OF SOME OF THE MAIN PROGRAMS TARGETED ACCORDING TO TFE FICHA CAS
BENEFiT Nature Who can apply? Eligibility crHteria
(amounts in Chilean pesos relate to the year
1998 and are monthly amounts)
FOR ALL BENEFITS AND PROGRAMS BELOW -The common eligibility criteria is to show evidence of
lack financial resources, according to the evaluaton
made through the means-testing survey with the fiche
CAS
- be a resident of the comuna (borough) responsible for
the selection of beneficaries
PASIS
Pensl6n Asistencial
Pensions for the elderly and for the
disabled
- Pension de Andanidad - minimal amount: $23,415 Low-Income elderly people over 65 years -be older than 65 years at the time of the survey with
(pension for the elderly) - automatically entitUes the elderly with a card allowing of age the ficha CAS
free access to public health services (tae eta de -lack of access to any other sodal insurance induding
gratuidad m6dica) pensions
-the pension can no longer be provided if the -total income inferior to 50% of the minimal pension
beneficiary situation stops meeting the criteria. This is amount (aprox. 23,415)
usually evaluated following the visit by a ficha CAS
surveyor.
- Pensi6n de Invalidez (Invalidity) -the benefit has a duration of 3 years and can be Physically disabled people (personas -the total income of the applicant and of his family
renovated, provided that the requisites are still met invAlidas), older than 18 years of age group (comprising all other members of the dwelling
(mainly number of points with the ficha CAS) - No access to other pensions or other unit) cannot be superior to the minimal pension
--automatically entitles the elderly wfth a card allowing forms of social protection mechanisms (sin
free access to public health services previsi6n socia_
-Pensi6n de Invalidez para Deficientes Same as above Same as above, except the following Same as above
Mentales characteristics:
- mentally disabled people
- no age requirement
SUF Subsidlo Unico Familiar(family allowances)
-al Menor (child benefit) -child benefit All dependent children, under 15 years of -for children under 6, health control must be up to date
-amount: $2500 age or studying children under 18 -for children older than 6, must be enrolled in primary
-duration: 3 years- can be renewed education (Educaci6n Basica)
-the child cannot perceive an income equal or superior
to the amount of the benefit
a la Madre Mothers of the children selected for the - the father of the child cannot receive family
(matemal benefit) subsidio al manor allowances from other sources (e.g. through his
employer
-Matemal -matemal benefit Pregnant women. To be allowed from their - the father of the child cannot receive family
-amount: 2800 received ten tmes. fifth month of pregnancy allowances from other sources (e.g. through his
employer)
-Recien Nacido -child monthly benefit of 2800 pesos - lasts for three Mothers who benefit from the subsidio
- - fmm th hi,rth nf the ,hil, I mdaRm,i snd whn d nnot have access to l
other forms of social protecton (sin
__________________________________ previsi6n socialSubsidio de agus potable -state contribution to the consumption/use of drinkable Low income families facing difficulties to -be up to date with the payment of water and
water and water sewerage (alcantalilado) pay for water services sewerage services
- This contribution finances haff of the consumption of
water up to a maximum of 15 m3
Housing programs"'7
Vivienda Subsidy of 132 UF for the construction of housing. -families facing emergency situation in -All those who are registered and who meet the criteriaProgresive I Etapa The program vivienda progresiva has two stages. terms of their housing or simply lacking will enter the selection process according to the strictStage I (etapa 1) comprises, as a minimum, of an adequate housing of housing - - order of 'points' obtained in the specific survey
urbanized site and a sanitary unit (bath/kitchen) total particularly (but not necessarily) applies to conducted with ficha CAS
value: 14OUF). The applicanfs contribution will be 8 families living under free-rent arrangements -The applicant must have saved the equivalent of 3UF, of which 3 UF are necessary as a requisite for the (allegados) UF.
application. 
-elderly people who are not owners of or -group-based applications are encouraged
assigned with a viviendai and who did not .
previously receive a housing subsidVivienda 
-2d stage of the program above improvement of the 
- specific and complex criteria - see MIDELANProgresiva 11 Etapa housing unit (1998:21)
Wvienda Basica (basic housing) -construction of solid housing unit (can indude i) one- Low-income households willing to have - All those who are registered and who meet the criteriafloor house; ii) two-floor houses; and iii) apartrnent in a access to housing in a definite manner (en will enter the selection process according to the stridcthree-floor building block. forma definitiva) order of 'points' obtained in the specific survey
conducted with ficha CAS
-Total value is 240 UF and the financement is 
- the applicant must have saved the equivalent of at
arranged as follows: least 5 UF in order to be able to enter the process of
-applicanfts savings (10 UF- see eligibility criteria) selection. By the time the housing is available for
-140 UF state subsidy (in monthly dividends delivery, the applicant must show evidence of the samethroughout 12 years) amount of savings.
- and the remaining through the applicants own
contribution (monthly dividends)
Childcare programs
Programs JUNJI, INTEGRM Integral care of the child in childcare centers (indudes -for children between 84 days and a years - in addition to ficha CAS, there is a 'social reporthealth, food provision, social welfare -atenci6n socia- and 11 months ( children under five) evidencing lack of resources.
and dental-medical attention) 
- mother must be working , with certificate certifying the
mothers working situation, her income, working hours
10_Ohe_cntaly_inncd.ouin 
_programs_include_the_ru_a__husing_subsidy_S_hsidio_Hab and typoe of aclivity.
107 Other centrally financed housing programns include the rural housing subsidy (Subsidio Habitacional Rural).
APPENDIX 2. CAS FORM AT THE TIME OF THE QUALITATIVE FIELDWORK (DECEMBER 1997)- ENCUESTA CAS
SISTEMA DE INFORMACION SOCIAL
SECCION 0: DATOS GENERALES
_____________________ 
1~ ~ ~ 1 3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3 0 4 Folio No
Reei6n Metronolitana Comuna Huecharaba 4
2 1 5 1 Urbana Fecha de
Provincia Unidad Vecinal 2 Rural Encuesta dia/mes/ano
Nombre del Campamento. Pobladi6n o Villa. C6digo Manzana Cod. Calle Nombre de la Calle o Camino Numero Block/Casa Depto/Sitio
Sector Cod Calb Nombre de In Calke, Camino o Cafetera Nument Aceratona
Encuesta: __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Revisor:
Supervisor:
SECCION 1: PROTECCION AMBIENTAL
MATERIALES USADOS EN MUROS MATERIAL UTILIZADO EN EL PISO DE MATERIAL UTILIZADO EN EL TECHO DE
EXTERIOES DE LA VIVIENDA LA VIVIENDA LA VIVIENDA
1. Ladrillo, concreto o bloque I . Radier revisto (radier cubierto con parque, tabla,
2. Albaflerla de Piedra lin6leo, flexit, baldosa, alfombra, etc) 1. Teja, tejuela, losa, piedra
3. Tabique forrado 2. Radier no revisto (radier a la vista) 2. Zinc o pizarreflo con cielo interior
4. Adobe 3. Mixto aceptable (combinaci6n de materiales, pero 3. Mixto aceptable (combinaci6n de materiales, pero
5. Mixto aceptable (combinaci6n de material pero alguno de tipo I a 4) alguno de tipo I o 2)
alguno de tipo I a 4) 4. Madera colocada sobre solera o vigas 4. Zinc o pizarreflo, sin cielo interior
6. Barro, quinona, pirca 5. Madera, plastico o posteriores colocados 5. Fonolita
7. Tabique en foro interior directamente sobre la tiefra 6. Paja, coir6n, totora, cafla
8. Desecho (cart6n, latas, sacos, etc) 6. Piso de tiena 7. Desecho (cart6n, latas, sacos)
9. Mixto deficiente (combinaci6n de materiales pero 7. Mixto deficiente (combinaci6n de materiales, pero 8. Mixto deficiente (combinaci6n de materiales, pero
ninguno de tipo I a 4) ninguno de tipo I o 2) ninguno de tipo I o 2)
SECCION 2: HACIMIENTO
22 PIEZAS OCUPADAS DE LA VIVIENDA
Dormitorios
Estar (living)
Comedor
Estar - Comedor
Cocina (s6lo si es utilizada
Como estar o comedor
Total de Piezas
SEC,CIeNT 3I Q I 1A lAl w TT' J CI T
~~~~~~~1 s[w- - I s-'V \
TIPO DE ABASTECIMIENTO DE SISTEMA DE ELIMINACION DE DISPONIBILIDAD DE TINA 0 SUMINISTRO ELECTRICO DEAGUAS DE LA VIVIENDA EXCRETAS DE LA VIVIENDA DUCHA LA VIVIENDA
De uso exclusivo (no comparte con otras La vivienda dispone de electricidadEl agua proviene de red puiblica de agua De uso exclusivo (No comparte con otras viviendas) I . Con medidor particularpotable viina1I. Tina a dud*chaon agua caliente 2. Con medidor compartido (con otras1. Con llave dentro de la vivienda nviendas) 2. Tina o ducha, sin agua caliente viviendas2. Con llave dentro del sitio fuera de la I 3. Sin medidorvivienda I . W.C. conectado a aluantajloada De compartido (con otras viviendas) 4. La vivienda no dispone de3. De llave de pil6n o grifo ubicado fuera 2. W.C. conectado a fosa s6ptica electricidad
3. Letioa Pozo negro 3. Tina o ducha, con agua caliente
del SitlO 4. Pozo negro 4. Tina o ducha, sin agua calienteEl agua no proviene de red pfiblica de agua 5. No ticnepotable De uso compartido (con otras viviendas)
4. Con llave dentro de la vivienda
5.. Con llave dentro.del sitio, pero fuera de 5. --W.C. conectado a alcanterrilla
la vivienda 6. W.C. coneetado a losa septica
6. Por acarreo 7. Letrina sanitaria
8. PoZo negro
9. No tiene (eliminaci6n a camnpo libre)
DECLARACION: Declaro que los datos proporcionados son
Legitimos y asumo la responsabilidad por ello.
FAM I (__
FAM2 (2)
FAM 3 (__
FAM4 (4)
SECCION 4: IDENTIFICACION DE LOS RESIDENTES (Todos) SEC. 5: OCUP. ING. SEC SEC
Todos los de 14 afios y mas 6 7
SUB EDU
0
Cedula de Fecha de
0 1; Apellidco Apellido Matemo Primer Nombre identidad con Nacimiento | o Montode S -
' Ji Patemo digito DiatMes/Afo Idngresos
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (e p-) 4
o~~~~~ ~~~ i . Siti proio sin deds fnins
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
2
3
4
SECCION 8: PATRIMONIO iEFE DE FAMILIA Y/Q SU PAREJA
FAMILIA No. Para cada familia que habita en la
vivienda indique la situaci6n bajo la cual
ocupa el sitio. ILa familia tiene algiin televisor que
I . Sitio propio, sin dcudas. funciones?
2. Sitio propio, sin deudas atrasadas.
Registre en esta columna 3. Sitio propio, con deudas atrasadas. 1. Tiene TV en colores
los nuneros que us6 para 4. Arrienda el propietario del sitio sin 2. Tiene TV en blanco y negro
identificar a las familias pagos atrasados. -er 3. No tiene TV.
que habitan en vivienda. 5. Usan el sitio, per no creen que
Si en la vivienda viven e pueden ser desalojados en losmSi den luar viinavivens pr6ximos meses.
mas dc cuatro famnilias L6. Usan el sitio, per si creen que
use una segunda ficha de pueden ser desalojados en los
encuesta. pr6ximos 6 meses.
,La familia tiene refrigerador ILa familia tiene calefon o l
que funcione? termo para calentar el agua?
1. Si tiene rcfrigerador -1. Si tiene calefon o termno
2. No tiene refrigerador 2. No tiene calefon o termo -E
I 
